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When a new high-speed railway (HSR) is planned, one of the 
most important elements to consider in decision making is the 
economic and social balance of the system. For this purpose, the 
life cycle cost (LCC) of the principal components is essential. Ob-
viously, the extension of the life cycle for each element is a clear 
indicator of the total LCC and, in the case of rolling stock, this 
extension depends on many different factors: type of trains, type 
of components, type of operation, infrastructure, kind of mainte-
nance and its cost, technology evolution, and so forth.
In Europe, the life cycle for HSR rolling stock has traditionally 
been considered to be 30 years (probably due to an economic 
perspective, or as a tradition extrapolated from other types of 
rolling stock), while in Japan, it is considered to be only 17 years. 
This large difference in life cycle is based on fatigue of the train’s 
body shell: The tunnel cross-section for HSR lines (Shinkansen) 
in Japan is very narrow; consequently, each time a train passes 
through a gallery, significant compression and decompression is 
produced. This effect is similar to what occurs in airplanes and 
requires the pressure inside an airplane cabin to be reduced. The 
repetition of this cycle hundreds of times a day makes a careful 
analysis of the fatigue phenomenon necessary in Shinkansen 
trains, and generally leads to a regular renewal of the fleet.
This continual renewal of the fleet permits an almost contin-
uous incorporation of new technologies, as any possible innova-
tion can be easily incorporated. In addition, it imposes important 
conditions on the maintenance policy (and consequently on the 
maintenance cost), such as the general avoidance of large main-
tenance operations, and so forth. It also requires an accurate 
investment plan—other than a recycling materials plan, because 
recycling high-speed (HS) trains for other purposes or for other 
countries does not yet occur.
In Europe, the main characteristics of the infrastructure and 
the operation conditions permit a longer life cycle; consequent-
ly, rolling stock requires “lifting,” or a thorough overhaul around 
the middle of its life cycle. As the first HS trains started in Europe 
in 1981, a significant percentage of the present fleet of Europe-
an trains is becoming too old. In some cases, such as that of the 
French railway system, an operation to provide these trains with 
a complementary life extension is planned, probably to enable 
them to reach a life cycle of 40 years or even more. In any case, 
the problem remains of how to face the renewal of the fleet of 
roughly 100 trains that started operation in 1981, and 110 more 
trains that started operation in 1989.
Ratios can provide a general idea of the magnitudes involved 
in this problem. A European manufacturer can supply around 1 or 
2 (and, exceptionally, sometimes more) trains per month to a cer-
tain operator, including the test and homologation processes. The 
cost of a typical HS train (200 m, 350–400 seats, 300–330 km·h–1) 
in Europe represents €30 million–32 million EUR (20 years ago, 
the cost of a similar train was €22 million EUR). The maintenance 
cost for one such train operating under typical conditions (roughly 
500 000 km per year) can be €1 million–1.2 million EUR per year.
Clearly, some European operators will find that facing the 
renewal of a significant part of their fleet, while simultaneously 
previewing an extension of the HS network and HS services, rep-
resents an important handicap, especially at a time when compe-
tition with other transport modes is increasingly important.
Now consider China’s impressive evolution of HS lines, trains, 
services, and stations. Chinese railway system actors (operators, 
industry, and authorities) spent some 15–20 years developing 
their own concept for HSR and getting their own technology 
ready. By learning from their own experiences and by bench- 
marking the experience gained from other HS systems around the 
world, they created new technologies, new products, and a new 
concept of the HSR system. Everything was ready when opera-
tions began in August of 2008. Today, less than eight years later, 
more than 21 000 km of new HS lines are in operation at speeds 
from 200 km·h–1 to 300 km·h–1, and more than 10 000 km of HS 
lines are under construction.
One of the characteristics of HS rolling stock, compared with 
other market vehicles, is the relatively low quantity of units that 
are built in each material series. In comparison, automobile facto-
ries produce hundreds of thousands of units, while aircraft manu-
facturers produce thousands. However, for HSR, a hundred trains 
represents an enormous quantity of production. Thus, the low 
quantity of units imposes important restrictions on the design, 
manufacture, and cost by a different application of the economy 
of scale.
Chinese railways operate more than 1600 HS train sets, all 
less than eight years old. Considering what is happening now 
under similar conditions in Europe (albeit on a different scale), 
what will happen 30 years from now? HSR lines will be longer, 
traffic will be significantly greater, and the rolling stock fleet will 
be much bigger and more solicited—but it will have an age limit. 
China Railway will then be obliged to renew a 1600 HS train fleet, 
without the galvanizing euphoria of the “early days.”
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The answer to this problem should rest on the main principles 
of HSR. A focus on service to customers (and society) and on the 
identification and anticipation of necessities for future perfor-
mance will be the key elements to take into consideration for 
planning railway operations. At this point, identifying the actual 
necessities of equipment, stations, infrastructure, and rolling 
stock should be the starting point for planning long-term invest-
ments.
The technology evolution will play an essential role in this en-
tire process. The Chinese railway sector is in an excellent position 
to carry out new and impressive developments coming from rail-
way companies, universities, research institutes, and the industry. 
The carefully planned renewal of this enormous fleet will be an 
excellent opportunity to incorporate further advancements, up-
date the competitiveness of HSR, and ensure both its survival and 
its important role in the future transport passengers market.
